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Abstract
The past decade has seen a dramatic acceleration of gov-
ernment involvement in cybersecurity. Cyberspace is now 
viewed by many states across the globe as critical national 
infrastructure and cybersecurity as essential to successful 
governance of their nations. Yet the actions of states betray 
a bias towards an offense-oriented focus on cybersecurity 
issues, a bias that carries with it significant implications for 
the private sector and, in particular, the information securi-
ty professionals who work within it. We suggest that now is 
an important time for the information security profession to 
avert its focus on the technical and operational minutiae of 
the problem, and step back to contemplate the implications 
of the wider picture.
Over the past decade we have seen a steady militariza-tion of cyberspace, generating heated debate and endless speculation. During this time we have seen 
governments engage to a much greater degree in cybersecuri-
ty. Many governments regard cyberspace as an essential com-
ponent of their critical national infrastructure. As a result 
they see cybersecurity as a significant issue that underpins 
their ability to operate the state and oversee the well-being 
of their citizens. Inherent in the designation of cyberspace as 
critical national infrastructure is the inclusion of the national 
security establishment by policy makers when devising and 
implementing cybersecurity strategy.
Yet the discovery of Stuxnet and its viral stable mates, ad-
vancements in legal thinking on the applicability of interna-
tional law on cyber warfare, and a flood of revelations relat-
ing to global surveillance programs have given us a somewhat 
troubling glimpse of how state involvement in cybersecurity 
is manifesting itself. For the information security communi-
ty at large this poses significant new security challenges and 
raises serious questions around the future role of information 
security practitioners, particularly those operating in the pri-
vate sector.
As information security practitioners, we are adept at iden-
tifying potential dangers based on events that are unfold-
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is ever traced back, there will always be grounds for plausible 
deniability. Further, cyber-offensive operations also keep per-
sonnel out of harm’s way. This is a significant feature of war-
fare that has begun to dominate the technology and tactics of 
the Western military establishment.
Cyberspace warfare aspirations are, of course, not limited 
to Western governments. Many states around the world are 
accelerating development of their own cyber-offensive capa-
bilities. Indeed the development of an offensive capability in 
cyberspace offers the potential appeal of relatively low entry 
costs compared to the development of more traditional infra-
structure and weaponry. 
Collateral damage
The irony here is that the very states that are pushing the 
boundaries in cyber offense are also the ones that most rely 
on cyberspace for conducting their day-to-day business. Fur-
ther, many of the states that are trying urgently to catch up for 
fear of being left behind are the very ones that are betting on a 
secure cyberspace to develop their economies. 
As we witness the development of a cyber-offensive arms 
race, in which some states may act responsibly when it comes 
to exercising cyber power and others undoubtedly will not, it 
is worth considering the extent to which the private sector is 
becoming “collateral damage.” Cyberspace is, after all, a man-
made domain, primarily comprising of infrastructure built, 
owned, and maintained by private-sector interests for their 
own ends. Thus the offense-focused cyber activities of states 
are not being conducted in military isolation, but instead di-
rectly interact with the infrastructure that global commerce 
and domestic industry crucially depend upon.
As an example of the issues that this raises, recall the 
well-publicized downfall of the Dutch certificate authority 
DigiNotar. In June 2011, attackers began to compromise sys-
ing and linking them to past events already unfolded. This 
is essentially how we make our living. Arguably our greatest 
strength is our ability to work amongst the weeds and focus 
on the details of a given security problem, deconstruct it, 
and identify a solution. Unfortunately, this is also a poten-
tial weakness; with respect to any form of militarization, one 
needs to step back and take in the bigger picture lest the forest 
be lost amongst the trees.
The militarization of cyberspace
For over a year now we have been so focused on mass sur-
veillance activities conducted by national intelligence bodies 
that we have, to an extent, forgotten other types of state-sanc-
tioned cyber activities. Governments, perhaps out of disinter-
est, ignorance, and fear, have effectively abdicated responsi-
bility for cyberspace to military subordinates. Military actors 
view cyberspace as a war-fighting domain that is as ungov-
erned as Somalia and is a budgetary blessing in these strait-
ened economic times. Incidents like Stuxnet have given us 
only a glimpse of what is possible when the cyber capabilities 
of intelligence services and armed services work in unison. 
At a fundamental level, from the perspective of the state and 
its subordinates, the main objective within cyberspace is not 
ubiquitous Internet surveillance; it is to “dominate” cyber-
space. This desire for control looks well beyond the confines 
of the Internet and encompasses air-gapped networks, fire-
walled corporate networks, and overlay networks and touch-
es every layer of the OSI model from end to end.
Cyberspace has many appealing features for military actors. 
Foremost, it provides an opportunity to conduct offensive 
operations, safe in the knowledge that attribution is difficult. 
Operations can be conducted from the comfort of national 
borders, yet an attack may appear, at least to cursory exam-
ination, to have originated from almost anywhere. And if it 
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Fallout from state intelligence cooperation
It is not just direct action from state cyber operations that 
can impact the private sector. We have been treated to a cas-
cading deluge of revelations surrounding the cyber activities 
of US intelligence services and their global partners in both 
the public and private sector. As a result, many of the world’s 
biggest names in technology and telecoms have been left with 
some very difficult questions to answer.
Despite streams of denials of involvement, accusations came 
thick and fast while private sector organizations tried to dis-
tance themselves and restore market confidence. As the scale 
of cooperation between intelligence services and the US pri-
vate sector was revealed, many states and businesses around 
the globe began to view US companies with increasing suspi-
cion. It is safe to assume that these concerns will continue to 
haunt the companies involved for many years to come, which 
in turn will impact the US technology sector’s ability to com-
pete internationally. Indeed, 2013 estimates suggested that 
the sector could miss out on anywhere between $22 billion3 
to $180 billion4 in cloud sales internationally over a three-year 
period. A tangible example of such private sector loss is the 
much commented on decision of the Brazilian government 
to award a $4.5 billion5 contract to replace Brazil’s aging jet 
fighters to Saab of Sweden, despite Boeing of the US being the 
clear front-runner throughout the tendering process.
However, it is not just the US that has been exposed by these 
revelations. Many of its Five Eyes partners (UK, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia) were likewise implicated, raising 
concerns about their national tech sectors. In addition, ac-
cusations of interference with products from non-US man-
ufacturers will almost certainly impact the companies con-
cerned and their own domestic economies. And who would 
bet against us learning of similar behavior by other foreign 
intelligence services in years to come?
In addition to impact on individual companies there were 
even more far-reaching disclosures of attempts to undermine 
entire technologies. Of particular concern were the revela-
tions of well-funded, systematic efforts to undermine cryp-
tography. These revelations culminated in a December 2013 
Reuters article6 that raised some very difficult questions for 
RSA, now part of EMC, about the NSA’s ability to influence 
the integrity of RSA’s cryptographic products, specifical-
ly its BSAFE toolkit. The impact of this has the potential to 
seed doubts about the protective capability of cryptographic 
toolkits. It is thus not inconceivable that the actions of one 
private-sector organization could have knock-on effects for 
3 Castro, D., “How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?” 
2013 – http://www.itif.org/publications/how-much-will-prism-cost-us-cloud-
computing-industry.
4 Staten, J., “The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects,” 2013 – http://
blogs.forrester.com/james_staten/13-08-14-the_cost_of_prism_will_be_larger_
than_itif_projects.
5 Soto, A., “Saab Wins Brazil Jet Deal after NSA Spying Sours Boeing Bid,” 2013 – 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/18/brazil-jets-idUSL2N0JX17W20131218.
6 Menn, J., “Exclusive: Secret Contract Tied NSA and Security Industry Pioneer,” 
2013 – http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-
idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220.
tems at DigiNotar that, as well as being a CA for the private 
sector, issued Dutch government certificates. By July these 
same attackers were issuing rogue certificates. In September 
the sheer scale of the compromise came to light, leaving the 
Dutch government with little option other than to take over 
operational management of DigiNotar’s systems. Later that 
month DigiNotar was declared bankrupt. Following lengthy 
investigation, suspicion fell on the Iranian government for 
the DigiNotar attack. It appears that the attack objective was 
to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against Iranian citi-
zens using rogue DigiNotar certificates.1
Although there were many failures in the way DigiNotar 
handled the incident, the takeaway is that a private sector 
organization was effectively put out of business in less than 
four months by the unanticipated actions of a state attack-
er. Further, while DigiNotar itself was bankrupted, its legacy 
also had potentially catastrophic implications for its parent 
company, VASCO Data Security. At the time, it was estimat-
ed that VASCO faced losses of up to $4.8 million,2 but of far 
greater concern was an unknown liability exposure resulting 
from its ownership of DigiNotar.
The DigiNotar case also highlights that the motivation for a 
state attacking a private-sector company is rarely straightfor-
ward. In this case DigiNotar was simply a stepping stone to 
achieving an objective of no concern to the company. There 
seems little doubt that we will see more private-sector orga-
nizations surprised and alarmed to find themselves targets of 
state adversaries, and in many cases it seems likely that the 
targets will struggle to make sense of the unwelcome actions. 
The DigiNotar case also provides a timely reminder that pri-
vate sector information security professionals are not just re-
sponsible for the information assets of the business; they also 
carry a very real responsibility for the potential survival of 
the business itself.
1 Fox-IT. Black Tulip - “Report of the investigation into the DigiNotar Certificate 
Authority breach,” 2012 – http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
rapporten/2012/08/13/black-tulip-update.html.
2 Lennon, M., “VASCO: Losses from DigiNotar Bankruptcy under $5 Million, 2011 – 
http://www.securityweek.com/vasco-losses-diginotar-bankruptcy-under-5-million.
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companies that have not engaged in any cooperative relation-
ships with intelligence services.
The impact of espionage
In January 2009, Nortel, the Canadian multinational tele-
communications and data networking equipment manufac-
turer, filed for bankruptcy. Although the company had other 
issues, it is believed that sustained espionage significantly 
contributed to its demise. It appears that attackers had unfet-
tered access to the company’s networks for around a decade. 
Many Western states assert that cyber espionage is the most 
significant issue facing the private sector and point to China 
as a major culprit. While these states portray themselves as 
victims, critics assert that these states are engaging in many 
of the same activities. For example, alleged UK operations 
against Belgacom7 and US operations against Huawei8 raise 
questions as to where exactly the boundaries of national se-
curity missions are drawn.
The issues surrounding espionage are complex with seman-
tic, cultural, and historical factors all coming into play. But 
what is clear is that espionage presents the private sector with 
significant challenges, many of which are presented by the ac-
tivities of state actors.
Winners and losers
Historically attackers have always held an advantage over de-
fenders in cyberspace. The vast financial resources that states 
bring into play on the offensive side mean that attackers will 
continue to enjoy this advantage. Indeed, if unchecked, that 
advantage will surely grow.
Like the majority of those working in cybersecurity today, we 
do not hold any security clearances and are solely informed 
by open-source intelligence. It is therefore quite difficult to 
comprehensively assess a given state’s actual commitment to 
cyber offense relative to defense. However, estimates that the 
US military may be spending up to four times as much on 
cyber offense research than it does on cyber defense research9 
are of grave concern, particularly as the US model is one that 
many states globally aspire to emulate.10
Another area of particular concern is the stockpiling of ze-
ro-day exploits. Markets for zero-days are a major growth 
area, and states are amongst the newest and best-financed 
customers. Estimates vary, but it appears that sums of up to 
$250,00011 have been paid for quality zero-day exploits on the 
7 Der Spiegel, “Belgacom Attack: Britain's GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm,” 
2013 – http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-
belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html.
8 Der Spiegel, “Targeting Huawei: NSA Spied on Chinese Government and 
Networking Firm,” 2014 – http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-
chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html.
9 Wolfe, J. Cybersecurity Becomes Central To U.S. Interests. 2014 – http://www.
forbes.com/sites/investor/2014/01/14/cybersecurity-becomes-central-to-u-s-
interests/.
10 BBC. South Korea to develop Stuxnet-like cyberweapons. 2014 – http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-26287527.
11 Greenberg, A, “Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers' Secret Software 
Exploits,” 2012 – http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-
for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits/.
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tion to become the embodiment of its cyber capabilities to 
the exclusion and detriment of its private sector, then it is, 
in essence, trading influence for the illusory control of a do-
main that over the long term cannot be controlled. Ultimate-
ly states that allow identified vulnerabilities to go unchecked 
run the very real risk of allowing their capabilities today to 
become the vectors of criminal enterprise tomorrow.
From a private-sector perspective, it is likely that further mil-
itarization of cyberspace will result in the passing of a tipping 
point. Beyond this we will be sufficiently overwhelmed that, 
somewhat ironically, we will possibly no longer be able to 
manage cybersecurity risk without state support. On current 
trends, the likelihood is that the private sector gets dragged 
deeper into an offense-driven cyber-deterrence proposition. 
Another possibility, perhaps almost unthinkable today, is 
that organizations and individuals will deem it no longer 
worth the risk to continue operating in cyberspace.
The way forward has only one viable direction. For the pri-
vate sector as a whole, and information security practitioners 
in particular, it has become absolutely essential not to focus 
exclusively on the technicalities of securing our businesses in 
cyberspace. We must also stand up and actively engage in the 
political aspects of this challenging problem. This will need 
critical thinking beyond the confines of individual organi-
zational interests. It will also require proactively challenging 
the emerging status quo of progressive militarization of cy-
berspace. We must think well beyond the immediate require-
ments of our day jobs in order to safeguard society, and our 
profession, from an unpalatable future.
This article is abridged from an MSc Information Security the-
sis submitted to Royal Holloway, University of London.
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black market. The tacit legitimization by states of this activity 
will undoubtedly ensure that these markets will flourish. In 
doing so, states may even inadvertently be funding criminal 
enterprise.
There are, of course, private sector companies gaining from 
this industry. A new breed of small, specialist firms are spe-
cializing in providing states with access to zero-day exploits 
and other offense-focused tools. As their products reach ever 
increasing levels of sophistication, so too do the significant 
ethical and moral issues associated with this trade. For exam-
ple, a researcher discovering a new zero-day exploit can now 
choose whether to disclose it and potentially face significant 
legal, financial, or professional repercussions, or instead sell 
this knowledge for handsome reward.
This hardly bodes well for the future ability of private-sector 
manufacturers to identify and address future vulnerabilities 
in their products.
The way forward
From a private sector perspective, what we are seeing is the 
rapid erosion of a trust model we have come to depend upon. 
We trusted our hardware and software manufacturers to en-
sure that the products that they provided were as secure as 
they could reasonably make them. We trusted that if security 
issues were identified, then they would be investigated and 
addressed. We trusted our standards bodies to guide us in 
the right direction and to have robust mechanisms for en-
suring that the standards they produced were not prone to 
manipulation. Without these trusted foundations our ability 
to accurately assess risk, something that is incredibly difficult 
to do accurately at the best of times, becomes effectively im-
possible.
The militarization of cyberspace presents us with significant 
technical and legal challenges, but the biggest challenges of 
all are political. We traditionally require the state to find the 
right balance between military, business, and social priorities 
in cyberspace. Evidence of the recent actions of military ac-
tors suggests that this balance is not currently correct. That 
is not to suggest that the armed and intelligence services of 
most Western democratic states are in some way intentional-
ly malicious towards the private sector or society as a whole. 
After all, there are boundaries defined by the state within 
which subordinates must operate. However, it seems that 
state governments have not been able to resolve major issues 
that arise where these boundaries overlap and conflict. This 
problem is further compounded by military actors who are 
expected to operate up to and even on these boundaries that 
quickly widen as technology rapidly advances, but law lags 
behind. This is something that we are very familiar with in 
other aspects of information technology: the ongoing tension 
between law and technology surrounding digital rights man-
agement being a prime example.
The irony here is that the true source of a state’s power in cy-
berspace rests not in its military but in the market dominance 
of its technology private sector. If a state allows militariza-
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